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  A positive theory of mitigation of environmental degradation is discussed in order 
to understand the formation of environmental policy. When an environmental problem is 
not mitigated, this is because those affected don’t know it is happening, cannot locate the 
cause, don’t have the resources to abate the problem if they are its producers, or don’t 
have the political power to influence policy to stop the problem if they are not its 
producers. The last is related to inequalities in political power and its implications are 
examined further. These include implications for the spatial spread of unmitigated 
pollutants produced by the powerful as opposed to the poor, and the implications of 
political structure for the overall level of pollution. These and related hypotheses are 
examined with reference to examples, and, where possible, with representative data. It is 
shown that there is an important sense in which the “Environmental Kuznets Curve” does 
not exist. 
                                                 
1 This is a revised version of a lecture delivered at the University of Siena’s International School for 
Economic Research’s XV
th summer workshop in June 2002. 
2 Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi. E-mail: som@isid.ac.in   Environmental problems occur as a side effect of other activities. Economists 
have emphasized that they are a case of negative externalities. If they are left unchecked 
this is because the losers are different from those whose activities create the problems. 
This is not always the case. Sometimes the problem is created by those who suffer from 
it. An important example is indoor air pollution, which is very widespread in poor 
countries and occurs as a result of cooking with low-quality stoves or open fires using 
traditional fuel like wood, charcoal, or agricultural wastes. The problem is left unchecked 
because the victims do not have the resources or technology to deal with it, and perhaps 
also because they do not understand the extent of the harmful effects on their health. 
 
  The traditional economic approach to such a problem is that as long as people do 
understand the problem, there isn’t one, since they choose to do nothing about it. The 
public-health approach to these issues is very different and reflects the belief that people 
often do not have the knowledge needed to make informed decisions. In this approach, 
attention is focused on what kind of education is necessary to deal with various health 
problems. 
 
  We will return to these issues as they occur also in the context of externalities and 
may, in fact, be magnified in their presence. Consider from now on only those polluting 
or environmentally degrading activities for which total benefits fall short of total costs in 
the sense that it would be impossible for the gainers to compensate losers and still be 
better off.  
 
When the victims of such activities are aware of the cause of degradation, they 
will act to end it if they have the political power to do so. It follows that pollution will 
remain unabated when the net losers from the polluting activity have less political power 
than the net gainers. This implies that resource degradation and pollution will tend to take 
place in locations where the net losers from polluting activities lack the political power to 
stop them or abate their effects (Boyce, 1994).  
 Who the net gainers are will depend a great deal on market structure in the 
polluting industries. If the industries are competitive, then the net gainers will mostly be 
consumers of the products of those industries. To the extent that the polluting industries 
generate rents, however, then producers will get a share of the net gains from pollution. 
They may not then face a significant problem of collective action in lobbying to protect 
these rents. This is even more true when government officials themselves are collecting 
the rents. Deforestation owing to logging of tropical hardwoods in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines is an example of this. Leases for logging were given to timber 
companies with extensive government contacts, resulting in huge deforestation. 
Politically puny traditional residents of the forests had little or no chance of stopping 
them. 
 
When is this conjunction of weak victims and powerful beneficiaries likely to be 
seen? When political power is concentrated, and there are rents to be had in the polluting 
industries. The rents can be used to buy influence over government policy or government 
policy can be made to create rents. Sometimes it is difficult tell which came first, the 
chicken or the egg. The concentration of political power channels rents towards those 
who wield it, making it less likely that pollution will be abated. Authoritarian states tend 
to concentrate political power. They also have the convenient feature that protests and 
attempts to organize by anti-pollution activists can be crushed. Oil production and related 
pollution in Ogoni land in Nigeria is a much-publicized case in point.  
 
What are the countervailing factors which favor abatement? The losers from 
pollution should also have some political power. This is more likely to be the case if there 
exists a reasonably large middle class. When the economy is diversified the economic 
interests of the upper classes are diffused through several industries. A significant section 
of them may be adversely affected by pollution without seeing sufficient economic gains 
from its existence to be net beneficiaries. This class can then put up resistance. 
 
The poor, on the other hand, are least likely to be able to influence policy in their 
favor. They face the difficulties of having the least access to the relevant information, the least contacts with government officials, the least access to the news media, and the least 
resources to devote time to collective action. Of all these factors, the role of the media 
deserves further comment. The media is mostly driven by the concerns of its readers and 
viewers, and sometimes, by advertisers. Since, in poor countries, a significant section of 
the public is illiterate and cannot afford television, their concerns and problems affecting 
them attract the least attention in the media. Two consequences follow: they are then all 
the less likely to be informed about environmental problems concerning them, and, in 
addition, the state is under less pressure to address such problems. This feature of 
economic inequality producing political inequality is less pronounced in developed 
countries but still present simply because affluent people are a more important target for 
advertisers and, therefore, for the news media. 
 
These considerations suggest that when the poor are the net losers from pollution, 
it is least likely to be abated. This implies that unabated pollution will be more severe in 
poor countries. Further arguments which strengthen this conclusion come from the 
observation that environmental problems are often not recognized as such without 
considerable research. The toxic effects of various pollutants are often not apparent. 
Identifying these problems, their health effects, and their causes may be a major research 
undertaking for which poor countries simply lack the infrastructure.  
 
A related but distinct issue is the availability of impartial expert opinion. Consider 
the controversy over the building of various river development projects involving dams, 
the Narmada and Tehri projects in India, and the Three Gorges dam in China. 
Considerable research was needed to establish the likely environmental consequences of 
dam-building, with estimates of earthquake risks, siltation rates, and so forth being 
required. Neither country has much by way of a university system with impartial 
scientists with the necessary expertise. Instead, the news media in India were full of 
reports quoting either advocates or opponents of the projects. While some of these 
“experts” did have expertise in the relevant disciplines, most were not impartial, since 
they were either partisans getting government funding to defend the projects or linked to 
non-government organizations opposed to the projects. The university system is simply not large enough and sufficiently resource rich to generate the academic discourse 
necessary for the scientific process of peer review to weed out motivated claims. In these 
circumstances, it becomes difficult for the public to judge the truth of the matter and 
make an informed decision to support one side or the other. The result is the occasional 
panic, as happened during the plague that struck Surat in 1994. In fact, plague is treatable 
and far less dangerous than many other diseases to which Indians are exposed but which 
evoke little reaction. More frequently, however, the lack of reliable information on which 
to base a judgement works in favor of the polluters, since making changes to the status 
quo of pollution requires some costly collective action, which is not forthcoming on the 
basis of unreliable information.  
 
One implication of the theory of the supply of pollution abatement outlined above 
is that unabated pollution by the poor is likely to be of short range, affecting mainly the 
poor, while that by the rich is likely to be of long range and thereby affecting not 
themselves so much as less powerful people living further away. The principal examples 
of the former are air pollution from the cooking fires of the poor and degradation of local 
common property resources such as forests and pastures. Air pollution from cooking fires 
affects principally those cooking, and to a lesser extent others in the household as well as 
immediate neighbors. To some extent this reflects externalities within and between 
households. The gender division of labor and the lower status of women in patriarchal 
societies means that while all members of the household benefit from the cooking, 
women and young children suffer disproportionately from its ill effects (Parikh et. al., 
1999). 
 
An example of the rich polluting unabated at long range is carbon emissions and 
global warming. Most of the buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has originated 
in the rich countries. Until very recently, most studies of the threats of climate change 
have indicated that the mainly poor tropical countries are likely to be the worst sufferers 
while the rich temperate countries are likely to see fewer adverse effects and may even 
realize net gains from the climate change brought about by fossil fuel combustion.  
 Where pollution by the rich affects other rich and, therefore, powerful people, 
abatement is faster in coming. The abatement of halocarbons that threatened the ozone 
layer, and that would affect the rich temperate countries most, is an example. The 
Montreal Protocol and its successors have been very effective in reducing and even 
ending emissions of various halocarbons. It is true that the difference between these two 
cases can also be explained by appealing to costs. Abatement of halocarbons is a low-cost 
affair compared to abatement of pollution from as fundamental a part of the economy as 
its principal energy source. Nevertheless, the small sums spent on research on non-
polluting energy sources suggests that the difference between these two cases is not one 
of abatement costs alone. For example, in 1997-98, the total public sector research and 
development spending on renewable energy and energy conservation in the US, the 
European Union and Japan, which together account for over 95% of all energy research 
spending worldwide, was about US$ 1 billion (Dooley and Runci, 1999). By way of 
comparison, the total R&D budget for 2002 for the US alone exceeded $100 billion, with 
$50 billion going to the Department of Defense, and $1.5 billion to counter-terrorism 
R&D (Koizumi and Turner, 2002). 
 
The theory discussed so far suggests that pollution by the poor will be abated if 
the rich are adversely affected by it. Two questions arise immediately. If this is true, then 
why is water pollution from untreated sewage so prevalent in poor countries in which the 
rich and powerful also live? Second, air pollution in Third World megalopolises is often 
largely from vehicles driven by the poor or lower middle class while the rich in these 
countries are concentrated in these cities.  Why does this persist? 
 
The answer to the first question is that the rich can to a large degree, though not 
perfectly, insulate themselves from water pollution by treating their domestic water 
themselves. This is what they do.  A partial answer to the second question is that there are 
producer lobbies in poor countries which account for the persistence of polluting vehicles 
driven by the lower middle classes and poor. For example, in India, manufacturers who 
have invested heavily in two-stroke engine two and three-wheeled vehicles have 
prevented a ban on them. A similar observation applies to manufacturers of obsolete diesel engines for trucks and buses. The obsolete domestic industry grew up under trade 
barriers and is an obstacle to further progress. This is also true of the domestic oil 
refining industry which continues to produce low-quality diesel.  
 
We have so far discussed two factors that affect pollution abatement. One, the 
informational issue, affects the demand for environmental quality, while the second, 
political structure, affects its supply. In addition, of course, income affects the demand 
for environmental quality positively. Income also affects incipient pollution, meaning the 
pollution that would occur if environmental costs were not taken into account at all. One 
may expect that this will be increasing in income in accordance with the well-known 
IPAT equation (Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971) which says that environmental Impact = 
Population x Affluence x Technology. The logic of this is that increased economic output 
and technological capacity results in a greater use of natural resources and creation of 
waste in the course of production and consumption. Actual pollution or resource 
degradation is the result of incipient pollution being reduced as a consequence of 
environmental abatement expenditures, which depend on the demand for environmental 
quality and its supply, which in turn, depend on the factors indicated above.  
 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis is that actual pollution rises with 
per capita income and then falls as abatement increases in response to the demand for 
environmental quality. The theory discussed adds to this the notion that the supply of 
environmental quality will depend on the distribution of power. More democratic 
countries will abate more. This should strengthen the effect of income on abatement as 
per capita income and democracy are correlated. However, we can also test whether 
democracy matters, controlling for income and its distribution. The latter control is 
necessary since, as pointed out by Scruggs (1998), inequality in incomes may lead to less 
pollution. The reason is that at higher income levels, there is a greater demand for 
environmental quality. Moreover, consumption may be less intensive in materials and 
more intensive in services which may result in less pollution per dollar of consumption.  
 The data on environmental indicators that are used in most cross-country studies 
are from the Global Environmental Monitoring System of the UN, started in 1977. These 
monitor selected air pollutants: sulfur dioxide concentrations, smoke, and heavy particles 
in 19-42 countries, and water pollution using measures of dissolved oxygen and fecal 
coliform bacteria in 58 countries. Monitoring is not nationally representative: air 
pollution data are from major cities which may not represent urban pollution in the 
various countries.  
 
Torras and Boyce (1998) find that for low-income countries (among which there 
is considerable variation in inequality and democratic rights), inequality is associated 
with more of some pollutants and less of others. The reason may be that the effect of 
inequality on the composition of output is to reduce pollution while the political effect of 
inequality is to increase pollution. There is also the problem of the non-representative 
nature of the data mentioned earlier, as well as the fact that the data on income 
distribution are known to be very inaccurate. 
 
Torras and Boyce find that the effect of democracy , as measured by their  
“rights” variable, on pollution is more consistently negative at least for low-income 
countries. The probable reason for this is that it picks up only the political effect. Despite 
the various problems with the data, there is some support for the idea that a wider spread 
of political power reduces pollution. 
 
It is important to note, however, that an uncritical use of the UN Global 
Environmental Monitoring System data can present a highly misleading picture. For 
example, most studies find an upward-sloping part of the Kuznets curve at low incomes, 
although the evidence for whether there is a downward-sloping part at higher incomes is 
mixed. But there is a selection bias in the nature of pollutants monitored. The two biggest 
health problems afflicting the poor in developing countries are water-borne diseases and 
respiratory infections, with the possible exception of AIDS in Africa. It is well 
established (Smith, 2000), but unfortunately not yet well known, that indoor air pollution 
is a major cause of death in poor rural, and to a lesser extent, urban households in poor countries. But indoor air pollution monitoring has hardly begun anywhere in the world. 
To proxy for its effects, we examine a graph of the quantity of traditional fuel used per 
capita against per capita income in Figure 1 below.
3  
Figure 1: Per capita traditional energy consumption against income 
 
Source: Graphed using 1995 energy data (billions of Joules per capita) from World 
Resources 1999. GDP data for 1995 are in US dollars adjusted for purchasing power 
parity from the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank. 
It is clear that traditional fuel use declines with income at low levels of per capita 
income, and therefore, so must exposure to indoor air pollution. The reason must be that 
households switch to cleaner fossil fuels as soon as they can afford to do so. This is 
probably not because they are aware of the lethal effects of smoke, but rather because it is 
a nuisance. The upturn in the graph for high income countries may be due to non-
domestic uses of certain fuels and almost certainly does not reflect an increase in 
exposure to toxic indoor smoke. 
                                                 
3 This variable includes industrial as well as domestic consumption of traditional fuels. So it is a very 
imperfect measure of what we are trying to capture: exposure to indoor air pollution from the use of 
polluting solid fuels in cooking. For example, Brazil’s consumption of alcohol for transport is included as a 
traditional fuel. Moreover, the quality of the data are poor for some countries, since they are from estimates 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization rather than from measurements.  
However, as the environmental Kuznets curve literature generally shows, it is also 
true that exposure to urban outdoor air pollution increases with income at low levels of 
per capita income. The question then is: what is the net effect of increasing incomes on 
exposure to air pollution? One can get an idea of this by looking at data for India as 
Smith (2000) has done. Indian cities are among the most polluted in the world. Outdoor 
concentrations of PM10, particulate matter smaller than 10 microns in diameter, range 
from 90-600 µg/m
3 with a mean of 200 µg/m
3. By contrast, the population-weighted 
mean for indoor concentrations is 700-800 µg/m
3 , more than three times as high.  To put 
these figures in perspective, note that the (outdoor) mean for the USA is less than 30 
µg/m
3.
  Moreover, exposures to these high concentrations are greater for indoor air 
pollution since those in the kitchen are nearer to the source for long periods of time every 
day.  
 
Since a switch from bio-fuels to gas results in indoor concentrations of fine 
particulate matter and other pollutants (carbon monoxide, polyaromatic hydrocarbons, 
volatile organic compounds) falling to negligible levels, it is clear that raising incomes 
enough to enable poor  households to make this switch would result in a considerable 
decline in overall exposure, despite the expected rise in urban outdoor air pollution. Thus, 
we may conclude that as far as air pollution is concerned, the idea that pollution increases 
with income at low levels of income is false. The idea seems to have gained so much 
ground because most of those conducting measurements were simply not aware of, or 
ignored, the principal air pollution problem facing the poor in poor countries. 
 
  So much for air pollution. What about water pollution?  As Figure 2 below 
shows, the proportion of those using water polluted by pathogens unambiguously 
increases with income.
4  Measures of chemical pollution as opposed to pollution by 
pathogens are not available as widely. Nevertheless, it is generally believed that their 
                                                 
4 The definition of clean water in the Human Development Report is: piped water, a public 
tap, a borehole with a pump, a protected well, a protected spring or rainwater. 
It is a reasonable measure of water that is not likely to transmit infections. 
 health effects are likely to be outweighed by the health effects of infection due to faecal 
pathogens, since the latter are far more frequent and have more immediate adverse effects 
(Gadgil, 1998). Just as in the case of air pollution discussed above, it appears that the 
adverse health effects of water pollution decline with increases in income.  
 
Figure 2: Exposure to unclean water against income 
 
Source: Data on water are from the UNDP’s Human Development Report 1999, while 
GDP data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Data are for 1997. 
  
  Thus, if one weights problems by some measure of their seriousness in terms 
of lost life-years and numbers of people affected, the biggest environmental problems 
globally appear to be those associated with poverty. This means that the environment 
actually improves with higher incomes, at least when one considers the move from low to 
middle incomes. This is the reverse of the Environmental Kuznets Curve.  Low income is 
the central problem. All the same, better information about health effects might induce 
some poor households to switch to more expensive cleaner stoves even without subsidies 
and similarly, increase willingness to pay for sanitation and drinking water infrastructure. But a public information program in the interest of the poor is not a high priority for 
governments for reasons discussed above. 
 
  So far, we have worked with the standard assumption that environmental 
improvements or pollution abatement are necessarily costly. Someone has to give up 
consumption when they are made.  This flows from the assumption that consumption is 
always a good thing. But there is a strand of literature in economics going back to Adam 
Smith (quoted in Ball et. al. (2001), through Veblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949),  and 
Galbraith (1958), to modern treatments like Frank (1985), and Ng and Wang (1993), 
which points out that this need not be so. People care about their status relative to other 
people, and this may lead them to consume more of goods that signal this status, than 
they would otherwise. One implication is that this will lead to underconsumption of 
public goods like environmental quality since such goods do not signal status. This is 
inefficient because, as long as everyone behaves this way, each person’s ranking in the 
consumption of the “status goods” is the same as it would have been if they had not taken 
their relative standing into account in making their consumption decision. Thus, the 
attempt to pursue status through consumption can be collectively futile.  
 
  It follows that social movements that attempt to discourage overconsumption, if 
they are successful in changing social norms, can lead to improvements in environmental 
quality at little or no real cost.
5 The campaign against wearing furs of endangered species, 
and against the use of ivory are examples of successful movements. More generally, there 
has been a movement to discourage waste and improve conservation of energy. This is a 
much bigger effort and I am not aware of any studies that attempt to measure its impact. 
If successful, it would have implications not only for environmental quality, but also for 
the distribution of income, since it could lower world prices of fossil fuels to the benefit 
of those who consume too little of them. The dynamics of such social movements and 
changes in social norms is little understood, although there is a now growing literature in 
                                                 
5 A conventional economic instrument for dealing with the negative consumption externality, progressive 
taxation of consumption, is proposed by Frank (1999).  economics on social norms, conventions, and fashions, which utilizes evolutionary game 
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